The Slaughter Pen

Union General William Rosecrans had plans to attack the Confederate right flank and drive it away from the Nashville Pike (today’s Old Nashville Highway) by sending troops under the command of Major General Thomas Crittenden across the Stones River. In an attempt to fool Bragg and make him think that the majority of his men were aligning along his left flank near Franklin Road, on the night before the battle he set up scores of fake campfires in that area. Bragg took the bait. Now expecting a serious attack at this location, he pulled men away from his center and right to fortify the left. As it turned out, this worked in his favor because he attacked first on the morning of December 31st, sending his superior left flank against Rosecrans’ over exaggerated right. Confederate troops quickly overran the area (many Union troops were still eating breakfast), nixing Rosecrans’ plans for Crittenden’s men.

Throughout the morning Confederate troops pushed the Union right flank back in a sweeping motion towards Nashville Pike, like the hands of a clock running from 6 to 12 on the dial (ironically, these events took place from 6 AM to 12 PM). To see how the battle played out on the 31st, please study the Stones River Battle Maps.

By noon it was obvious to Rosecrans that the Confederates were dominating the right flank of his army and that if drastic measures weren’t taken soon, his troops would be pushed beyond Nashville Pike. If that were accomplished, the Union escape route to Nashville would be cut off. A defensive line strong enough to stop the onslaught had to be set up along the Pike. In order to do so, troops of the Union center had to hold out long enough to give the rest of the army time to organize the defense.

This was accomplished by one of Rosecran’s right-center divisions commanded by Brigadier General Philip Sheridan and a center line division of Brigadier General James Negley. Tour Stop 2 focuses on an area of fighting defended by Negley’s men, known as the Slaughter Pen, but this defensive line stretched westward to where Sheridan’s men were located. These two groups of soldiers were able to hold out for two hours under heavy fire, giving Rosecrans the time he needed. However, success came at a heavy cost—a 40% causality rate for troops of both sides.

The geological features of the Slaughter Pen are so unique that I have never seen the likes of it in all of my travels. It’s as if God dug his outstretched fingers into the rock and then ripped them across to form natural knee- to waist-high trenches. No wonder Union troops were able to ward off multiple attacks, for rapid forward progress through this area is impossible.

Known as karst topography, these formations resulted from a limestone and slate bedrock being penetrated by water over millions of years, which eroded the soft limestone but left the slate. This formation actually stretches from Stop 2 on the Stones River National Battlefield all the way to the west side of the park boundary. Thus, there was no going around it. The Confederates had no choice but to send wave after wave of men at the Union troops.